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“The vitality and stability of our democracy – as well as the economy – eventually
depend on the social permeability of our society.”
(Horst Köhler, German Federal President, 29. 12. 2007, authors’ own translation)
This statement draws attention to the strong meritocratic beliefs concerning the equal-
ity of opportunity that dominate public debates. This is especially true of the education
system. But does this general concern translate into a society in which one’s economic
success in the labor market is independent of the family into which one was born?
And if so, to what degree?
In this study, we investigate intergenerational earnings persistence among German
workers. Our measure of labor market success is real monthly earnings before taxes
and social security contributions. The relationship between fathers’ and sons’ labor
market earnings is assessed using samples drawn from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) 1984Ð2006. We introduce a novel sampling procedure that allows us to
observe father-son pairs at a fairly similar stage in their lives.
From a variety of microeconometric estimates (utilizing both OLS and IV methods)
we suggest that the best point estimate of intergenerational earnings elasticity among
German workers is one-third. Hence, if in the period of investigation a father’s perma-
nent labor market earnings increased by 10 percent (€ 231 at the mean of our father
sample), the son’s long-run economic status grew by 3.33 percent. Evaluated at the
mean of our sample of sons (€ 1,937), this implies a step up of € 63 for the son.
This figure indicates a lower degree of mobility (and a higher degree of persistence)
in Germany compared to preceding studies. In an international perspective, the inter-
generational earnings persistence in Germany seems to be lower than that in the
United States and higher than that in Sweden. To summarize: there still seems to
be substantial intergenerational earnings mobility among German workers, but more
persistence than previous research suggested.
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1 Introduction and motivation
The vitality and stability of our democracy – as well
as the economy – eventually depend on the social
permeability of our society.1
This statement draws attention to the strong meri-
tocratic beliefs concerning the equality of opportu-
nity that dominate public debates. This is especially
true of the education system. According to public
rhetoric the aim is to guarantee social mobility in
Germany. Families receive a child benefit transfer,
schooling for up to 13 years is free of charge and, if
education is continued at a university, the cost of
living is covered by federal aid for students from
low-income families. But, does this general concern
translate into a society in which one’s economic suc-
cess is independent of the family into which one was
born? And if so, to what degree?
To empirically analyze the intergenerational rela-
tionship, the following econometric model
yi
1 = α +  yyi
0 + %i
1 (1)
is used as a starting point (Corak 2004). A linear
relationship between the long-run economic status
yi
0 and yi
1 of family i in generation 0 and 1 is as-
sumed, allowing for shifts in the mean economic
status irrespective of parental status via the parame-
ter α. Deviations from the predicted status due to
market luck or other random elements in the inter-
generational transmission of skills and personal
traits are summarized in the idiosyncratic error
term %i
1. Ideally, permanent earnings are chosen as
the measure of economic status (Friedman 1957).
We use both terms to describe the long-run eco-
nomic success of an individual. In the case all status
variables are measured in their natural logarithm,  y
in equation (1) is the intergenerational elasticity of
permanent earnings. It measures the (expected) per-
centage change in the offspring’s economic status as-
sociated with a one percent change in their parental
success. In principle,  y can take any value but most
studies find a value between zero and one.2 A posi-
tive value indicates generational persistence of per-
manent earnings in which higher parental long-run
status favors the economic success of the offspring;
a negative figure indicates generational reversal of
economic status. A value of zero for the intergenera-
tional elasticity  y (child’s and parents’ economic
success are unrelated) corresponds to complete in-
1 Horst Köhler, German Federal President, in an interview with
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29. 12. 2007, Berlin (authors’
own translation).
2 See Solon (2002) for a recent survey.
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tergenerational mobility, while a value of unity (the
child’s economic success is completely determined
by the parental achievement) is associated with
complete immobility. (1 -  y) provides a measure of
the degree to which economic status regresses to the
mean (Becker & Tomes 1986; Goldberger 1989). If
it takes the value one ( y = 0), a child of parents who
attain a below average long-run status can expect an
average status just like the offspring of high-status
parents.
Although there is agreement about the existence of
an intergenerational link in economic status, a
number of recent studies debate its varying magni-
tude across countries (Solon 2002; Grawe 2006;
Jäntti, Røed, Naylor, Björklund, Bratsberg, Raaum,
Österbacka & Erikson 2006; Vogel 2007). While
many features of the human skill formation process
are universal, there may however be unique features
in German data. In an international perspective, low
tuition fees and federal student aid might ease the
impact of borrowing constraints and thus enhance
mobility in Germany compared to other countries.
The contribution of our paper to the literature on
intergenerational persistence is twofold. First, based
upon recent improvements in the understanding of
the association between short- and long-run eco-
nomic status we assess the potential biases in previ-
ous studies. Deviations of current from permanent
economic status arise due to transitory fluctuations
(Bowles 1972; Solon 1992) and a time-varying asso-
ciation between the two (Haider & Solon 2006;
Grawe 2006). We introduce a novel sampling pro-
cedure that takes both into account and makes it
possible to observe father-son pairs at a fairly sim-
ilar stage in their lives. Second, the relationship is
assessed for Germany with samples drawn from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1984Ð2006.
Our results suggest that the best conservative point
estimate of intergenerational earnings persistence
among western German workers is 1/3. This indi-
cates a lower degree of mobility (and a higher de-
gree of persistence) in Germany compared to
Couch & Dunn (1997) and Wiegand (1997) but is in
line with Vogel (2007), who compares intergenera-
tional mobility in Germany and the United States.
In an international perspective, the intergenera-
tional earnings persistence seems to be lower com-
pared to the United States  US
y = 0.4 (Solon 1992),
and higher compared to Sweden  S
y = 0.2
(Björklund & Jäntti 1997). There still seems to
be substantial intergenerational earnings mobility
among western German workers, but more persis-
tence than previous research suggested.Philipp Eisenhauer and Friedhelm Pfeiffer Assessing Intergenerational Earnings
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 provides an introduction to the economet-
ric methods applied to estimate intergenerational
persistence with incomplete data. Section 3 presents
our novel sampling procedure with the SOEP. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the econometric findings, and sec-
tion 5 concludes.
2 Econometric problems and findings
from the literature
In this section the econometric problems associated
with measuring intergenerational persistence and
the conclusions we draw regarding its estimation
among German workers are pointed out.
2.1 Measurement error problems
The deduction of an individual’s permanent earn-
ings requires a lifelong earnings history. Since re-
searchers usually lack direct measures of long-run
status yi
0 and yi
1 for two generations in order to in-
vestigate intergenerational mobility, they rely on
proxies (yi
0h, yi
1t) of permanent earnings for each
generation (0,1) observed at ages h and t. Some-
times only single-year measures of earnings3 have
been used. Usually, however, a short-run measure of
economic status is an imperfect proxy of long-run
status. It is subject to measurement error due to
transitory fluctuations and lifecycle variation in the
association between current and lifetime earnings.4
2.1.1 Transitory fluctuations
Current earnings of fathers yi
0h and sons yi
1t can be











1 describe time-invariant permanent earn-
ings, while (vi
0h,v i
1t) indicates time-varying transi-
tory fluctuations. The latter might arise from job
mobility, business cycle effects or variable compen-
3 See Behrman & Taubman (1985) as an example.
4 For a further errors-in-reporting problem see Bound & Krueger
(1991) and Duncan & Hill (1985).
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sation schemes. If current earnings deviate from the
permanent status, using them as a proxy for the
long-run status introduces attenuation bias in the
estimation of equation (1). Assuming that vi
1t and
vi
0h are uncorrelated with each other and permanent
earnings yi
0 and yi
1, a deviation implies a downward
inconsistency of the estimated slope coefficient
  ˆ OLS
y in an OLS estimation by the factor θh (Solon
1992).
plim   ˆ OLS
y  θh y Ý  y (4)
θh 
Var[y0]
Var[y0]  Var[v0h] (5)
The attenuation factor θh captures how much signal
Var[y0] is provided by the measure y0h relative to its
total noise, Var[y0h]  Var[y0]  Var[v0h].
Based on single-year snapshots, empirical findings
by Corcoran, Laren, Gordon & Solon (1991), Card
(1994) and Hyslop (2001) suggest an attenuation
factor around θh = 0.5. This implies a (considerable)
signal-to-noise ratio of observed parental earnings
and an attenuation bias of (1 - θh) = 0.5. Note also,
that transitory fluctuations in the offspring’s earn-
ings vi
1t do not bias the OLS estimation in equation
(1) as long as they are uncorrelated with vi
0h. How-
ever, the higher their variance, the larger the confi-
dence interval of   ˆOLS
y will be.
Averaging parental earnings
To decrease the magnitude of the inconsistency, So-
lon (1992) suggests averaging parental status over T
years, which reduces the variance of the noise rela-
tive to the signal. Transitory shocks are averaged







As more years of data are used, the attenuation
factor θh rises and the attenuation bias (1 - θh) de-
clines. According to Mazumder (2005), the attenua-
tion factor θh rises to θh = 0.7 (from θh = 0.5) when
relying on a 5-year average of earnings. The attenua-
tion bias is reduced to [(1 - θh) = 0.3]. Solon (1992)
and Wiegand (1997) estimated an intergenerational
elasticity of fathers’ and sons’ earnings based on 5-
year averages of 0.4 for the United States and 0.2 for
Germany. Given the attenuation factor mentioned
above, the true elasticities would come closer to 0.6
for the United States and 0.3 for Germany.Assessing Intergenerational Earnings Philipp Eisenhauer and Friedhelm Pfeiffer
Instrumenting parental earnings
In a second approach to estimate  y, the direct pro-
jection of yi
1 on yi
0, Solon (1992) proposes an IV
estimation. Acknowledging the difficulties of finding
an instrument that is correlated with parental long-
run status but not a structural determinant of the
offspring’s permanent earnings, the basic model in




1   1yi
0   IIi
0  ωi
1 (7)
In this case, performing an IV estimation of  y using
Ii
1 as the instrument yields the following probability
limit, Solon (1992).
plim   ˆ IV









  ˆ IV
y is an unbiased estimator for  y only if theinstru-
ment does not influence the offspring’s status ( I =0 )
or the instrument and parental status are perfectly
correlated, |κ| = 1. The closer |κ| is to one, the
smaller the bias as there is less variation in earnings
that is not captured by the instrument. Assuming a
positive but imperfect correlation between the in-
strument and parental long-run status, the direction
of the inconsistency is determined by  I. If the in-
strument Ii
0 has a positive impact on the offspring’s
status ( I > 0), the estimator will be biased upward.
If the opposite is true, the estimated coefficient is
downward biased like the OLS estimate.
In empirical research, parental years of education
(Solon 1992; Dearden, Machin & Reed 1997) or in-
dicators of occupational prestige (Zimmerman 1992;
Wiegand 1997) have been used to instrument long-
run parental status. Since years of education en-
hance labor market earnings, it may capture an im-
portant part of parental permanent earnings, al-
though not necessarily 100%.5 In this case an IV
estimate using years of education will be upward bi-
ased.
Estimating the intergenerational elasticity   ˆ
y using
OLS and IV techniques therefore suggests bracket-
ing the coefficient (Solon 1992). The OLS estimate
is downward inconsistent due to error-in-variable
bias, whereas the IV estimate is presumably upward
5 See Card (1999) for a recent survey.
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biased. Accounting for the associated standard er-
rors,  y is located between the two estimates.
  ˆOLS
y Ý  y Ý   ˆIV
y
2.1.2 Lifecycle variations
Empirical research as well as theoretical reasoning
suggest that wage workers differ with respect to
their age-earnings profiles.6 This may occur due to
age-specific heterogeneity in human capital invest-
ment or variations in the wage structure across jobs
set up by firms for the purpose of effort regulation
and incentive compatibility. For estimation pur-
poses, the projection of current on permanent earn-
ings is generalized to include a time-varying parame-
ter λt,h to capture age-specific aspects in the associa-
tion between current and permanent earnings over









Averaging parental earnings yi
0h across T years, the
interaction of both types of measurement error is
considered. If the parents’ and the offspring’s long-
run status is proxied by short-run earnings, equation
12 determines the potential bias.
plim   ˆOLS








Assuming θh = 1, the probability limit of the esti-
mated coefficient   ˆOLS
y is λt y instead of  y. In the
case of λt = 1 (as implicitly assumed in the discussion
of transitory fluctuations) this does no harm, but in
general, the estimator will be inconsistent and the
inconsistency varies as a function of age t at which
earnings are observed. Focusing on the impact of θh
(setting λt = 1), it is not clear whether the combina-
tion of transitory fluctuations and lifecycle variation
leads to an amplification bias instead of an attenua-
tion bias. For λh > 1 the estimation is downward bi-
ased, but for values smaller than one and minor
transitory variance the opposite is true. θh is a sum-
mary measure of the attenuation bias resulting from
transitory fluctuations as well as lifecycle variation.
Therefore the age composition of the sample
matters (Jenkins 1987; Grawe 2006). In summary,
neither measurement error in the offspring’s status
6 See Mincer (1975) and Baker (1997) among others and Vogel
(2007) for an application to intergenerational mobility.Philipp Eisenhauer and Friedhelm Pfeiffer Assessing Intergenerational Earnings
nor measurement error in the parental long-run
status is innocuous for consistency. Both induce
either amplification or attenuation bias of the OLS
estimation.
Using U.S. Social Security Administration earnings
histories of members of the Health and Retirement
Study sample, Haider & Solon (2006) assess the
magnitude of measurement error in the offspring’s
and the parents’ permanent earnings separately.
Their dataset ranges from 1951 to 1991 and provides
almost full-career earnings histories for a broadly re-
presentative sample of the U.S. population. This
makes it possible to derive a more precise estimate
of the (logarithmized) present value of lifetime
earnings lnVi. Starting with the impact of measure-
ment error in the offspring’s (permanent) earnings
level, the forward regression of lnVi on yi
t,h leads to
the estimated slope coefficient λ ˆ
t,h depicted in fig-
ure 1. Starting at a value around λ ˆ
t,h = 0.2 it in-
creases steadily. At age 32, the textbook assumption
of λt,h = 1 seems reasonable. Thenceforward, λ ˆ
t,h de-
clines some in the late forties. Turning to the case of
measurement error in parental permanent earnings,
the estimated reliability ratio θ ˆ
h is depicted in fig-
ure 2. It is the result of a backward regression of
lnVi on a 5-year average of yi
t,h. A significant in-
crease until the age of 30 is followed by a quite ro-
bust factor between 0.6 and 0.8, but after the age of
50, θ ˆ
h declines and the bias rises. Unfortunately, we
are not aware of any comparable work for the case
of Germany.
2.2 Sample homogeneity
In selected sub-populations with respect to location,
socioeconomic status or occupation, the sample vari-
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ance in long-run economic status is possibly less
than in the whole population. For example, a study
by Sewell & Hauser (1975) was based on a selective
sample of sons from Wisconsin who graduated in
1957 and thus excluded high-school dropouts, leav-
ing only rather successful sons in the sample. Simi-
larly, Behrman & Taubman (1985) confined their
study to parental data on white male twins born be-
tween 1927 and 1929, who both served in the army.
Presumably, this father-sample is quite homoge-
neous. Both types of selectivity may introduce a
third source of inconsistency as Solon (1989) points
out. To concentrate on the effect of sample homo-
geneity, long-run status is assumed to be measured
correctly until indicated otherwise. Formally speak-
ing, the parent/offspring-sample is more homogene-
ous in long-run status, if the variance in permanent
earnings Var[y*
j0,1] is only a fraction τ of the pop-
ulation variance Var[yj0,1].
Var[y*
j0,1]  τVar[yj0,1] (14)
Under normality of parental economic status, selec-
tion on the dependent variable leads to a propor-
tional change in the estimated intergenerational
elasticity, where R2 is the coefficient of determina-
tion of the population-based regression model
(Goldberger 1981).
plim   ˆ OLS
y*  φ y Ý  y (15)
φ 
τ
1  R2(1  τ)
(16)
If τ < 1 (implying φ < 1) the estimated intergenera-
tional elasticity   ˆ OLS
y* is downward inconsistent even
though long-run status is measured correctly.
A sample exhibiting homogeneity in parental earn-
ings does not affect the consistency of intergenera-Assessing Intergenerational Earnings Philipp Eisenhauer and Friedhelm Pfeiffer
tional elasticity estimates. This is true as long as the
economic status is measured correctly. If this is not
the case, the downward bias is worsened (Solon





0] Var[v0h]  y  plim   ˆ OLS
y* Ý
plim   ˆ OLS
y 
Var[y0]
Var[y0] Var[v0h]  y
(17)
In applied empirical research, inclusion in an inter-
generational dataset requires both father and son to
report positive labor market earnings in the periods
of interest. Presumably, in such samples  y is under-
estimated, but the use of larger representative sam-
ples eases this problem. To the best of our knowl-
edge, however, there is no available research on the
magnitude of this bias.
3 Econometric approach
and sampling procedure
We estimate the econometric model presented in
equation (18). The son’s observed status yi
1t in year
t is expressed as a regression function of the father’s
observed status yi
0h in year h, including age controls
for both (Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992; Wiegand
1997; Vogel 2007). It is derived by incorporating
age-earnings profiles into equations (2) and (3) and
substituting this into the basic equation (1).
yi
1t   0   yyi
0h   1Ai
0h   2A2i





An individual’s current earnings are determined by
the level of permanent earnings (yi
1, yi
0), the stage




h )], a general level
of economic well-being in the corresponding gen-






1  α1  γ1 Ai





0  α0  γ0 Ai
0h  δ0 A2i
0h  vi
0h (20)
The empirical part is based on samples from the
German Socio-Economic Panel7 (SOEP) from 1984
to 2006. To assure comparability of real earnings ob-
served in different years, they are adjusted by the
real GDP growth rate. Our measure of long-run
7 Consult Haisken-DeNew & Frick (2005) for further information
on the dataset.
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economic status are real8 monthly earnings before
tax and social security deductions as reported in
each cross-section of the SOEP.9 This allows interna-
tional comparison.10 Measuring all earnings vari-
ables in their natural logarithm, we choose the inter-
generational earnings elasticity as our indicator of
intergenerational persistence (or mobility) and use
the two terms interchangeably.
Thus, our indicator is a summary measure of per-
sonal characteristics shared by parent and offspring
that are valued in the German labor market. This
includes similarities in educational attainment, cog-
nitive and noncognitive skills and personal traits
(Bowles, Gintis & Osborne-Groves 2001; Bowles &
Gintis 2002; Heckman 2007; Pfeiffer & Reuß 2008).
A novel feature of our study is the sampling pro-
cedure. We select pairs of fathers and sons in such a
way that their earnings are observed at the closest
possible stage in their lifecycles. Furthermore, the
bias due to transitory fluctuations and lifecycle vari-
ation is minimized, see table 1. As a start, the
self-employed, who have more volatile earnings
(Baker & Solon 2003; Albarra ´n, Carrasco & Martı ´-
nez-Granado 2007; Pfeiffer 1994), are excluded.
Only the full-time employed are retained in the
sample, that is individuals reporting that they
worked more than 35 hours in the last week.
Workers from eastern Germany are excluded as well
since the possibility of mobility increased dramati-
cally after the fall of the Berlin Wall and dynamic
wage growth11 may have changed the reliability of
current earnings to reflect permanent status. To
avoid sample homogeneity, only the oldest sibling is
included in our baseline specification (Solon 1992).
Migrants, identified by their country of origin, are
dropped for our basic analysis. Migration might dis-
tort the long-run relationship between the labor
market earnings of father and son due to the change
of the labor market (Borjas 2006; Friedberg 2000).
However, we perform a separate analysis for mi-
grants and discuss the results. For the group of fa-
thers, moving 5-year averages of earnings and age
8 Deflated by the consumer price index (base year 2000) supplied
by the German Federal Statistical Office.
9 This approach is similar to Wiegand (1997), but different from
Vogel (2007), who calculates a measure of yearly earnings from
monthly earnings records.
10 See Solon (1999) for a survey on intergenerational earnings
mobility. We concentrate on the persistence of labor market earn-
ings. For research using a more inclusive measure of total eco-
nomic status composed of a variety of differing types of income,
earnings and monetary inheritance see Piketty (2000) and Mulli-
gan (1997) among others. It is left for future research to construct
a more inclusive measure with the SOEP, since sample size is
reduced and the problem of measurement error increases.
11 See Hunt (2002) among others.Philipp Eisenhauer and Friedhelm Pfeiffer Assessing Intergenerational Earnings
are calculated to reduce the attenuation bias. Thus,
if for a given observation earnings are not observ-
able in each of the four following years, it is
dropped.
Furthermore, the following age restrictions are im-
posed (and relaxed again for further discussion) to
take into account the time-varying association be-
tween short- and long-run economic status. This pro-
cedure takes into account the pattern of the vari-
ance of the transitory component over the lifecycle
(which flattens out at mid age in the U.S. (Baker &
Solon 2003)). Since the association between
monthly and lifetime earnings is still low for workers
below the age of 30, we select workers above that
age. For younger workers job mobility is high and
earnings are more volatile, partly because of lower
tenure (Haider & Solon 2006; Björklund 1993).
Workers aged over 50 are excluded as well. Labor
market status and hours worked may become more
volatile again, which might depress the estimated
level of persistence (Grawe 2006). However, this
line of reasoning may differ between countries, for
instance as a result of different industrial structures
or different degrees of employment protection
(Blau & Kahn 1996; OECD 1999; Pries & Rogerson
2005).
Finally, father (obsk and obsl) and son (obsj and
obsi) observations (of family n) satisfying the sam-
pling rule are matched in all possible combinations,
see figure 3. This procedure leads to numerous
matched observations for each father-son pair. To
identify a unique pair, intended to lead to the most
reliable estimate of the intergenerational elasticity,
a decision rule is implemented. For each observation
we select the one with the smallest absolute age dif-
ference between father and son. This is to ensure
that father and son are observed at the most similar
stages in their lifecycle possible. If more than one
observation for a particular father-son pair still ful-
fills the requirement, the one associated with the
lowest father age is used. For comparison and dis-
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cussion, other samples with less restrictive selection
rules are utilized in the next section.
The sample contains 180 father-son pairs compared
to Wiegand’s (1997) 130 and Vogel’s (2007) 300. Ta-
ble 2 depicts the basic statistics. The age difference
between father and son amounts to 8.68 years. Sons
in the sample report lower earnings than their
matched fathers which is mainly explained by theAssessing Intergenerational Earnings Philipp Eisenhauer and Friedhelm Pfeiffer
early stage in their lifecycle. While most information
on the father’s economic status is obtained within
the early SOEP waves, the collection of information
regarding the offspring is not confined to the most
recent wave. The age composition of our sample dif-
fers substantially from previous studies. Sons are 35
years old, which is an increase of 4 years compared
to Wiegand (1997) and 13 years compared to
Couch & Dunn (1997). Solon (1992) reports an
average age of 29 for sons, while Björklund & Jäntti
(1997) rely on sons at the age of 34 on average. An
average age of 44 for fathers is slightly lower than
that reported by Wiegand (1997) with 46 years,
while Couch & Dunn’s (1997) fathers are 51 years
old. Solon’s (1992) fathers are reported to be 42
years of age on average, nearly identical to an
average father in Björklund & Jäntti’s (1997) sample
(43 years).
Selection could rise from the blind eye on individ-
uals not meeting the selection rules, table 2. The fi-
nal sample is compared to all workers meeting the
sample requirements except for the need to report
positive earnings 5 years in a row and being matched
with their offspring. The father-sample is contrasted
in 1984, while the son-sample is compared in 2004.
Earnings in the father-sample are almost identical to
those reported by all workers in 1984 (€ 2,331.01).
However, the standard deviation is higher in the
comparison group (€ 782.43) in 1984. Using 5-year
averages of earnings in the father-sample, therefore,
as intended, reduces transitory fluctuations. Com-
paring the son-sample, earnings are higher
(€ 1,917.13 in the comparison group) and show a
higher standard deviation (€ 574.15). In our son-




The OLS estimate based on a 5-year average of
earnings   ˆ OLS
y = 0.282 is higher than that obtained
by Wiegand (1997), whereas the one-year snapshot
is about the same, table 3. Compared to Vogel
(2007), the result based on the 5-year average of
earnings is similar. We use years of education12 as
12 This variable includes both school and occupational education.
The German school system introduces differentiated educational
tracks after four grades of primary education. The lower second-
ary school (Hauptschule) graduates individuals after five years of
secondary education and is traditionally a preparation for blue-
collar occupations. The intermediate secondary school (Re-
alschule) lasts six years and prepares pupils for white-collar em-
ployment. The highest track (Gymnasium) offers nine years of
schooling and a qualification (Abitur) which provides access to
academic studies. Completion of an apprenticeship adds another
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an instrument to bracket the intergenerational elas-
ticity. According to the IV estimate the intergenera-
tional elasticity is higher,   ˆ IV
y = 0.374. Following So-
lon’s (1992) approach, the intergenerational elastic-
ity of German workers should lie between the two
estimates and we suggest a reasonable value of 1/3.
  ˆ OLS
y  0.282 Ý  y Ý 0.374    ˆ IV
y
The 95% confidence interval of the IV estimate
[0.09    ˆ IV
y  0.66] includes the OLS estimate. Al-
though the two point estimates contain some useful
information, the degree of precision seems to be
rather low. We come back to this issue in the conclu-
sion.
4.2 Investigating the bias
from transitory fluctuations
Tables 4 and 5 report the general pattern that   ˆ OLS
y
increases with the number of years averaged as the
attenuation bias declines. This is in line with equa-
tion (6). For inclusion in the balanced panel, fathers’
earnings need to be observed for 5 years in a row
even though only lower averages are used for the
supplementary estimations. The changing estimate is
due to the reduced number of years averaged and
not to a change in the sample composition. For this
1.5 years, a technical college 3 years, and graduation from univer-
sity increases years of education by 5 years.Philipp Eisenhauer and Friedhelm Pfeiffer Assessing Intergenerational Earnings
reason, the number of observations remains con-
stant. The unbalanced panel, however, includes all
pairs with the necessary number of successive earn-
ings observations for the father that is needed for
the respective estimation. A comparison of the OLS
results in the balanced and unbalanced panels re-
veals that the difference between a 5-year and a
4-year average of fathers’ earnings is negligible.
However, it makes a difference in our sample
whether the estimate is based on a 1/2-year average
or a 4/5-year average. Averaging only a small
number of years amplifies the attenuation bias due
to a high volatility of the earnings measure utilized.
This result is in line with the literature as reported
in section 2.
The rather early decrease of the estimated coeffi-
cient in the unbalanced panel might be attributable
to the construction of the panel. When lowering the
number of years averaged, the added individuals do
not report earnings in the following year probably
due to unemployment or part-time employment.
This implies that father-son pairs with larger transi-
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tory fluctuations are added to the panel consecu-
tively.
4.3 Investigating the bias
from lifecycle variation
Raising the upper age limit from 50 to 55 results in
a rather sharp increase in sample size and a slight
decrease in estimated intergenerational persistence.
However, table 6 reveals an increase in the estimate
when continuing to relax the age restriction. This
seems to be in line with Vogel (2007), whose esti-
mate of intergenerational persistence in Germany
included individuals aged over 50 and is slightly
higher. We offer two explanations. First, the increase
could point to sample selection with only pairs
added that exhibit a particularly strong persistence
of earnings. However, a comparison of the descrip-
tive statistics (years of education, monthly earnings)
did not provide any evidence on the type of selec-
tion. Second, the increase in the estimated levelAssessing Intergenerational Earnings Philipp Eisenhauer and Friedhelm Pfeiffer
of mobility could be explained by an increase in the
reliability ratio θh in our sample rather than a
decrease as documented for the United States, fig-
ure 2. This is presumably the result of the compara-
tively high degree of centralization governing wage
determination in Germany and employment protec-
tion laws which, together with the accumulation of
specific human capital, favor incumbent workers.13
This could reduce the transitory fluctuations among
older German workers.
Table 7 documents a significant rise in the number
of observations and a sharp decline in the estimated
intergenerational elasticity when the age require-
ment for sons is consecutively lowered to 20 years.
This seems to be in line with Haider & Solon (2006).
The parameter λt (see equation (12) in section 2) is
lowered as younger and younger workers are added
to the sample and the lifecycle bias rises.
13 See Botero, Djankov, Porta & Lopez-De-Silanes (2004) and
Franz & Pfeiffer (2006) among others.
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The analysis above gave the impression that the age
composition of either sample is changed without af-
fecting the other. Obviously, this is not true since
father-son pairs are added. However, negligible
changes in the age composition of the unchanged
sample (with respect to the age restrictions im-
posed) support this approach.
4.4 An analysis of migrants and further
sensitivity checks
Analysis of migrants
The analysis of the migrant population14 is based on
93 father-son pairs when relying on a 5-year average
of earnings, see table 15 in the Appendix for the
detailed results. It emerges that the point estimate
14 Identified by the fact that at least the father was not born in
Germany.Philipp Eisenhauer and Friedhelm Pfeiffer Assessing Intergenerational Earnings
of the intergenerational earnings elasticity (  ˆ OLS
y =
0.41) is higher compared to our sample of German
workers. While the age structure of the samples are
fairly identical, there are substantial differences in
average earnings. For migrants, sons’ earnings are
lower (€ 1,617 compared to € 1,936). The same is
true for migrant fathers, who earn € 1,789 on
average compared to € 2,307 for a German father.
This suggests possible non-linearities in the inter-
generational link. For example Corak & Heisz
(1999) and Hertz (2005) present evidence of
stronger persistence among low-income families.
Including younger siblings
The inclusion of younger siblings raises the sample
size from 180 to 224 when relying on a 5-year
average of fathers’ earnings. The point estimate
is slightly reduced to   ˆ OLS
y = 0.276. Siblings share
the same family and community background, which
makes similar long-run economic status more likely
and increases homogeneity within the sample. This
depresses the estimated coefficient slightly, see
table 16 in the Appendix for the detailed results.
Adjustment of monthly earnings
To ensure robustness with respect to the measure of
comparability (GDP growth in the baseline estima-
tion), earnings are deflated by the growth rate of
average real gross monthly earnings in Germany’s
manufacturing sector (as reported by the German
Federal Statistical Office). The estimated intergen-
erational elasticity is not affected, see table 17 in the
Appendix for the detailed results.
Instrumenting parental status
To compare our findings with Wiegand (1997), the
IV estimation is repeated instrumenting parental
status using the Wegener index, a standard index for
occupational prestige. The baseline estimate (  ˆ IV
y =
0.372) remains unchanged. The finding that both in-
struments lead to fairly identical results is robust to
changes in the sampling rule, see table 18 in the Ap-
pendix for the detailed results.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
Table 8 compares our result to the international evi-
dence. Although the studies differ with respect to
data and methods, the comparison suggests higher
mobility (that is less persistence) in Germany com-
pared to the United States and the United Kingdom,
but lower mobility than Sweden.
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Our preferred point estimate of the elasticity in
Germany is  GER
y = 1/3, compared with  US
y = 0.4 for
the United States and  S
y = 0.2 for Sweden. In com-
parison to former studies by Couch & Dunn (1997)
and Wiegand (1997) on intergenerational persis-
tence in Germany, Vogels’ (2007) and ours suggest
higher persistence. This is the result of our special
attention to the sources of potential lifecycle bias.
However, what is common to all studies presented
in table 8 are the considerable confidence intervals,
which currently prevent any strong comparative
statements on the level of intergenerational persis-
tence.
For illustrative purposes, we conclude by working
out some consequences of the value of  GER
y = 1/3
for Germany. The intergenerational elasticity  y
translates intragenerational inequality in parental
long-run labor market status into the economic ad-
vantage which a child of parents with a higher eco-
nomic status can hope for compared to a child of
lower-status parents. Table 9 depicts the advantage
of a child with parents in the top permanent earn-
ings decile compared to offspring born to parents in













For Germany, Gernandt & Pfeiffer (2007) calculate
a 90/10-percentile earnings ratio of 2.5 for a cross-Assessing Intergenerational Earnings Philipp Eisenhauer and Friedhelm Pfeiffer
section sample of prime-age dependent male
workers in 2005, which is quite similar to our sam-
ple. Then, taking our advocated value for an inter-
generational elasticity in Germany of  GER
y = 1/3,
the expected earnings advantage amounts to 35%.
If  GER
y = 1/3 were 0.5, the advantage would in-
crease to 59%. We would like to add that a value of
0< y < 1 does not necessarily imply a compression
of the earnings distribution, because the variance of
the error term εi
1 in equation (1) matters, too.
Summarizing our findings, we find that intergenera-
tional earnings persistence among western German
workers is higher than previously suggested. A value
of  GER
y = 1/3 still indicates that there is substantial
intergenerational mobility, which is presumably a re-
sult of the massive expansion of publicly funded
education in Germany from the seventies onwards
and the openness of the German labor market.
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